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Global Economy

China and Central Asia:
A Significant New Energy Nexus
By Fakhmiddin Fazilov & Xiangming Chen

China now accounts for almost 20 percent of the world’s
energy consumption and its demand is still growing at high
speed. In order to keep up with the expanding industry China
turns to Central Asia with ambitious gas line projects and
considers countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan to be key factors in its energy security nexus.

A Rising China Reshaping the Global Energy
Landscape
The growth of China’s economy at historically unprecedented speed and scale over the last three decades has completely altered the supply-demand equation of global energy.
Its galloping manufacturing machine has been running on
massive quantities of coal and oil. From a country with no
private cars to the largest auto market in the world, China has
dramatically accelerated its petrol consumption. With millions of skyscrapers and lower buildings of all kinds shooting
up in its hundreds of large cities that have to be cooled and
heated, China has become a giant in the overall consumption
of energy by the world’s cities. Given its limited domestic
supply of oil and gas, China has to get this massive amount
of new energy from somewhere else in the world. It is the
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combination of the quantity and sources of China’s added
demand for energy that has spun a new web of global and
regional geo-economic ties involving Central Asia and other
regions such as Latin America.1
The nature and trajectory of China’s rising energy
demand have been shaped by the model and scale of its economic growth. China has built a huge number of exportoriented factories of massive scale in what can be called
factory-cities along its coast, some of which employ almost
one million workers like Foxconn’s factory in Shenzhen.
Moreover, China has put up gigantic buildings and transport infrastructure in these cities where millions of affluent
consumers live and drive. Nothing like this conjuncture of
powerful forces has happened in the history of industrialization, urbanization and modernization. As a result, China
has become world’s largest energy consumer in less than
20 years, accounting for almost 20 percent of the world’s
total energy consumption now (see Figure 1). This has also
turned China into the world’s second largest net importer of
oil today, from being an oil exporter in the 1990s (see Figure
2). Looking forward, China’s energy demand is expected to
expand 75 percent by 2035 when its lead over the United
States will be much larger (Figure 1).
Although China has a substantial domestic supply of
energy, especially coal, it has been looking abroad for more
and more sources of oil and gas. China produced an estimated 4.3 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil liquids
in 2011, which is forecast to rise to 4.5 million bbl/d by
the end of 2013. However, its booming economy requires
China to import more than 50 percent of the oil it needs.
According to the US Energy Information Administration
(EIA), China may import about 75 percent of the crude oil
it will consume by 2035.2
Figure 1.
China’s Rising Energy Demand, 1990- 2035 in Comparative
Perspective
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Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook (2010).

The International Energy Agency noted
that oil security has emerged as a central
policy in China, leading China to diversify
its access to energy resources globally.
In response to its tremendous energy needs, the Chinese
government has elevated its energy policy to a very high
priority. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently
noted that oil security has emerged as a central policy in
China,5 leading China to diversify its access to energy
resources globally. China imports a vast amount of energy
from the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific and other countries. In 2011, the Middle East, including Iran, supplied
2.6 million bbl/d (51 percent) to China, Africa 1.2 million
bbl/d (24 percent), the Asia-Pacific region 173,000 bbl/d (3
percent), and other countries 1.1 million bbl/d (22 percent).6
China has become heavily dependent on a number of distant
countries in the Middle East and Africa with low political
stability. To ameliorate this dependence, China has begun
to diversify its international energy sources by sponsoring
the development of China-bound pipelines in Myanmar
(Burma), Central Asia and Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Central
Asian vector of China’s energy policy has become considerably more important.

China’s Turn to Central Asia for Energy Supply
Of the non-Middle Eastern energy sources for China,
Central Asia looms large and close due to its abundance of
oil and natural gas deposits and relative regional stability.
Central Asia accounts for about 4 percent of global energy
deposits. The oil reserves in Central Asia and along the
Caspian Sea coast amount to 17 to 33 bbl/d, which are comparable to that of Qatar. China has turned to Central Asia
for energy supply, for two main reasons. Besides accessing
a more stable and closer source of abundant energy, China

Figure 2.
China’s oil production and consumption, 1990-2013
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China’s rapidly growing demand for energy is fueled by
its energy-intensive industries like steel, aluminum, automobiles, electronics and chemicals. China now accounts for
about 35 percent of the world’s steel production and about
50 percent of the world’s cement production. By the year
2030, the number of cars in China is projected to increase to
400 million from 27 million cars in 2004,3 driving up considerably more energy consumption. Natural gas consumption
in China has also risen over the past decade. In 2011, China
produced 3.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, 9 percent
more than in 2010. While natural gas accounted for 23.7
percent of global energy consumption in 2011, it was only
4.5 percent in China. China’s domestic gas is not enough to
meet the needs of these growing industries, which pushed
China’s gas import to jump from 12 percent of its consumption in 2010 to 22 percent in 2011.4

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Statistics and Short-Term Energy Outlook (August 2012)

aims to compete aggressively for its energy security by developing its “energy diplomacy” with the region. Secondly,
developing close ties with Central Asia through an energy
nexus will help China deter threats from the separatist activists in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. China has
reorganized the army units in Xinjiang to safeguard its oil
fields given the 3,300 km western border with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The root of connections between the Central Asian countries and China goes all the way back to the Silk Road times.
Diplomatic relations between China and the Central Asian
countries have been established since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991-1992. Trade between China and the
five Central Asian countries rose from $527 million in 1992
to $40 billion in 2011.7 China has increased its investment
in building roads and tunnels in Tajikistan, developing the
oil sector in Kazakhstan and constructing a 1,800-kilometer
natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. In Central Asia,
China has sought to establish a regional free trade zone,
partially as a way of tapping into the region’s vast energy
resources. Nowadays, the major Chinese energy players
in the region are China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
(SINOPEC) and Petro China. They have partnered with
local companies to compete with traditional power players
like Russia and multinational companies such as Chevron,
ExxonMobile and BP in the exploration and extraction of
oil and natural gas.
Two main pipelines from Central Asia to China, the
Central Asia-China gas pipeline and Kazakhstan-China oil

China has increased its investment in building roads and tunnels in Tajikistan, developing the oil sector in Kazakhstan and
constructing a 1,800-kilometer natural gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan.
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Kazakhstan’s total proven offshore and onshore fields’ reserves constitute about 37 billion
barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas, making Kazakhstan one of
the world's major oil producers with the potential to expand the production.
pipeline, are already in operation. The
Central Asia-China gas pipeline, spanning Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, and crossing Xingjian
Uyghur Autonomous Republic at the
border town of Horgos, transported 40
billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural
gas when it was first built. It is connected with China's second west-east
gas pipeline, which starts from Horgos
and ends in Hong Kong, stretching
8,704 km. China imported about 18.4
bcm of natural gas through its first
cross-border pipeline the last two years.
Given China’s plan to increase gas
imports from Central Asia by five times
by 2015, the Central Asia-China pipeline’s capacity will expand up to 55-60
billion cubic meters of gas per year.8
The further development of China’s
Central Asian energy pipeline projects
will involve a China-Arab line to the
oil terminals of the Persian Gulf. These
energy corridors will ultimately place
China in the center of a “Pan-Asian
global energy bridge,” which will link
existing and potential suppliers (Persian
Gulf countries, Central Asia and
Russia) to the major energy consumers
(China, Japan and Korea). If successful, it will not only improve the energy
security of China, but also strengthen
Beijing’s broader geo-political influence
in the region.

Further development of Sino-Kazakhstan energy cooperation may bring more opportunities to the region. Kazakhstan
and China have considered three opportunities.
Map 1a.
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The Sino-Kazakhstan Energy Ties
Its massive oil reserves make
Kazakhstan very attractive to China
in boosting energy cooperation.
Kazakhstan’s total proven offshore and
onshore fields’ reserves constitute about
37 billion barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas,
making Kazakhstan one of the world's
major oil producers with the potential
to expand the production of 2 million
bbl/d in 2010 to 3.5 million bbl/d by
2015. Kazakhstan’s reserves of natural

The discovery of Kazakhstan’s
giant Kashagan oil field, which was
considered “the largest oil discovery anywhere in the world in the past
20 years,”10 has prompted China to
reconsider its position regarding the
feasibility of Kazakhstan-China pipeline. As a result, the easternmost part
of the pipeline, running 988 km from
Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou at
the Chinese border (see Map 1A), was
completed at the end of 2005 and began
operating in May 2006, with a total
investment of $700 million.11 The 962
km long pipeline has been operating as

gas are around 8.6 tcm.
Chinese energy companies have
been operating and investing in
Kazakhstan where CNPC acquired
60.3 percent of shares of Kazakh oil
company Aktobemunaigaz in 1997.
CNPC later bought the entire shares
of the company and re-established
CNPC–Aktobemunaigaz. In addition, CNPC is in negotiation to buy a
49% minority stake in Kazakhstan’s
AO MangistauMunaigaz Company
from KazMunaiGaz. This deal gives
China control over about 15 percent of
Kazakhstan’s total oil output.9
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Sources: “China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security” International Energy Agency 2000;
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a 50-50 joint venture between state companies CNPC and
KazMunaiGaz. At the beginning, this pipeline was expected
to ship one million barrels per day of crude oil into western
China or 10 million tons of crude oil per year, but the pipeline is expected to increase its export capacity to 20 million
tons in the future.12
Further development of Sino-Kazakhstan energy
cooperation may bring more opportunities to the region.
Kazakhstan and China have considered three opportunities.
The first is to prolong the existing pipeline between cities of
Uzbekistan-Bukhara and Tashkent to Almaty, then through
Taldikorgan to Alashankou. The second is the construction
of a new gas pipeline connecting Ishim (western Siberia)
and Alashankou and the one going through Astana and
Karaganda. The third is a variant of constructing a pipeline
from Shalkar (western Kazakhstan) and one coming through
Kizilorda until Shimkent, with connection to the pipeline
Bukhara-Tashkent-Almaty.13
Is energy cooperation mutually beneficial to both China
and Kazakhstan? China considers Kazakhstan a key factor
in its energy security nexus, and sees the cooperation as
helping strengthen and secure its northwestern borders of
the volatile Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The
cooperation also provides new energy to support China’s
“Go West” program and helps it gain greater access to the
markets of Central Asia. Some experts see the increasing
Sino-Kazakh cooperation in the energy field as tied to the
long-term strategic interests of the two countries, especially
when faced with greater U.S. military presence in Central
Asia after September 11.14 For Kazakhstan, China can help
diversify its energy sector by balancing against Russia’s
influence in its energy field.

The future of Sino-Kazakhstan energy
cooperation will depend on the exploration of new oil deposits in the shelf areas
of the Caspian Sea.
The future of Sino-Kazakhstan energy cooperation will
depend on the exploration of new oil deposits in the shelf
areas of the Caspian Sea, which may strengthen Chinese
companies’ presence in the region at the expense of
European, American and Russian companies. The political
and economic contents of developing energy relations further
may be tied to the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), especially under the auspices of SCO’s
newly established “Energy Club.”

Turkmenistan and Uzibekstan in China’s
Energy Policy
Turkmenistan is one of the world’s largest natural gas
exporters. According to Oil and Gas Journal, Turkmenistan
has proven natural gas reserves of approximately 265 trillion

cubic feet (Tcf) in 2012.15 The abundance of natural gas
has drawn significant attention and interest from China.
Diplomatic relations between two countries were established
after the independence of Turkmenistan in 1992. Given the
significant energy component in their bilateral relations,
the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline project – as part of
the Central Asia-China pipeline – came into existence. The
Central Asia-China gas pipeline begins in Turkmenistan and
goes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before connecting
to a second pipeline running west to east within China (see
Map 1b). China and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in
July 2007 under which the latter would supply 30 bcm of gas
to China annually through pipelines for 30 years. It began
supplying gas on December 14, 2009.
The
President
of
Turkmenistan,
Gurbanguly
Berdymukhammedov, said during a state visit to Beijing on
November 23, 2009 that Turkmenistan would increase its
gas exports to a volume of 65 bcm a year.16 According to
CNPC, Turkmenistan has transported more than 30 bcm of
natural gas to China in more than 900 days using the Central
Asia-China pipeline, an amount making up a fifth of the
gas China used last year. Of the 30 bcm, about 10.7 bcm
came from the CNPC (Turkmenistan) Amu Darya River
Gas Co, and Turkmenistan's Natural Gas Konzern supplied
the remaining 19.3 bcm.17 Turkmenistan is expected to be
China’s principal supplier of natural gas via the pipeline that
traverses through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. By strengthening its energy relations with Turkmenistan, China not only
attempts to diversify its access to the new gas but also gains
greater flexibility in navigating the treacherous geopolitics
of the region.
The evolution of energy cooperation between China and
Turkmenistan should benefit both sides. Turkmenistan benefits from doubling its energy supply to China and circumventing its biggest competitors – Iran and Russia. Beijing wins
by securing new gas supplies and thus postpones plans to
deal with Iran until the political climate of the Middle East
improves.18 According to IEA, China’s natural gas import will
be around 30-40 bcm, and this amount could be covered by
Turkmenistan with its 60 bcm annual export capacity. China’s
consumption will lie in the range of 180 bcm to 200 bcm, and
production in the range of 120 bcm to 140 bcm by 2020. Based
on this assumption, the gap between demand and domestic
production by 2020 will amount to between 40 bcm and 80
bcm.19 This will reinforce China’s interest and need to buy
more gas from Turkmenistan.
Like with other Central Asian countries, China’s overall
relationship with Uzbekistan has improved over the last two
decades, which has contributed to a deeper and more mutually beneficial cooperation in energy. According to Oil and
Gas Journal, Uzbekistan holds an estimated 65 tcf of proven
natural gas reserves as of 2012, ranking it the fourth highest
in the Eurasia region and nineteenth in the world.20 To
gain access to this rich gas reserve, China has made major
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Map 1b.
CHINA’S THIRD WEST-TO-EAST NATURAL GAS
TRANSMISSION LINE
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gains by attracting Chinese investment to its energy sector
with spillovers to other sectors of its economy. China’s
investment in Uzbekistan now exceeds $4 billion. China has
already become Uzbekstan’s largest investor, third largest
trading partner, largest buyer of cotton, and largest provider
of telecommunications equipment.24

Investment:

125 billion yuan
Sources of gas:

- 25 billion cubic
meters from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan.
- 5 billion from the
Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region

300km
CHINA DAILY

first west-to-east
line
second
west-to-east line
third west-to-east
line

Sources: China National Petroleum Corp.

economic inroads into Uzbekistan where it has set up more
than 380 ventures with Chinese investment and also the representative offices of 65 large Chinese companies; among
them, CITIC, CNPC and China Machinery.21
The twin anchors of this cooperation are Uzbekistan’s
national oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz and Chinese
CNPC. In 2004, CNPC signed a contract with Uzbekneftegaz
on energy cooperation. In 2006, they signed two more agreements to explore and develop prospective petroleum deposits in five onshore blocks of the Aral Sea together with
Russia’s Lukoil, Malaysia’s PETRONAS, and South Korea’s
National Oil Corporation.22 A joint venture on oil exploration between Uzbekneftegas and CNPC was established in
the Mingbulak field. The intersection of the UzbekistanChina gas pipeline into the Central Asia-China gas pipeline
has added momentum to the energy cooperation between
the two countries. Uzbekistan started to supply natural gas
through this gas pipeline on August, 2012. As the ChinaCentral Asia pipeline is a double-line pipeline, including line
A and line B, the construction of line C with a length of
1840 kilometers to parallel lines A and B was launched in
2012, including a 157 km-long project undertaking by the
China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau. The 3-line gas pipeline of
Uzbekistan-China is projected to have a capacity of 25 bcm
gas.23 This ambitious gas project adds to the bilateral economic relations between China and Uzbekstan. Uzbekistan

China has already become Uzibekstan’s
largest investor, third largest trading
partner, largest buyer of cotton, and largest
provider of telecommunications equipment.

Replaying the Great Game, in Energy
As China has risen to the central gravity of the global
economy, it has brought Central Asia into the field of that
gravity through various energy connections. One should
not be surprised by this parallel or paired development
into a new regional energy nexus. For centuries, China and
Central Asia were linked through peace, war, trade and
marriage, with the exception of the last 100 years when
Central Asia fell into the orbit of tsarist Russian and Soviet
influence, and became delinked from China. Are we seeing
a replay of a Great Game in Central Asia, in energy, with
China and the United States replacing the former Soviet
Union and Great Britain?25
It is quite clear that China has already fully (re)entered the
arena where it plays aggressively to win a larger share of the
energy prize in Central Asia, while the United States may be
relegated to a second-tier role as its private oil companies, large
as they are like ExxonMobil, do not match up evenly against
China’s powerful state-owned oil giants such as CNPC. In
fact, the departure of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan
by the end of 2014 will open up more geo-strategic space for
China to fill with its energy and diplomatic activities. It may
also help China solidify the political stability of Xinjiang bordering Central Asia. In the longer run, China eyes Central
Asia as the strategic crossroad for its long land route to trade
with the Gulf and Europe.
In the short term, however, China needs to quell its thirst
for Central Asia’s oil and gas that can be brought overland
to power its factories on the eastern seaboard (Map 1b).
Therefore, China will continue to devote its diplomatic
energy to improving relations with the Central Asian countries to ensure a stable and substantial supply of oil and
natural gas that will reduce dependence on Middle Eastern
oil and can avoid shipping it along the more vulnerable sea

In the longer run, China eyes Central Asia as the strategic crossroad for its long land route to trade
with the Gulf and Europe. In the short term, however, China needs to quell its thirst for Central
Asia’s oil and gas that can be brought overland to power its factories on the eastern seaboard.
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China has been playing as a unified, rising power getting the amount of energy that it wants
and needs. This equation stands to favour China now and into the future as the regional energy
nexus evolves in the larger geo-political context of Eurasia.
route through the narrow Strait of Malacca. In addition,
Central Asia can help China diversify its energy supplies.
Given China’s attempt to develop nuclear energy by constructing about 30 new nuclear power plants, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan’s uranium deposits, which account for
around one quarter of the world’s uranium reserves, can
meet China’s critical need.
In all its facets, the China-Central Asia regional energy
nexus forms the axis of a new Great Game that will play on
for a long time. On one side, the five Central Asian states
are plagued by poor relations, with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan conflicting over boundary and water issues,
and the latter two remaining more dependent on Russia
through remittance from their migrant workers. On the
other side, China has been playing as a unified, rising power
getting the amount of energy that it wants and needs. This
equation stands to favour China now and into the future as
the regional energy nexus evolves in the larger geo-political
context of Eurasia.
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